The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company - Company Profile, Information, Business Description, History, Background Information on The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company

1144 East Market Street
Akron, Ohio 44316-0001
U.S.A.

Company Perspectives:

Goodyear is a truly global organization and the bearer of a universal ly recognized brand name. With worldwide production and technological resources, it offers customers unparalleled international experience and the capacity to respond to the particular needs of local markets . The Goodyear name stands for unquestioned quality and diversity in the tire and rubber products business.

History of The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company

The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company ranks third among the world's tire manufacturers, trailing only Bridgestone Corporation and Compagn ie Générale des Établissements Michelin. Nearly 90 percent of Goodyear's revenues are generated via the development, manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of tires for most applicat ions. The firm's tire brands include Goodyear, Dunlop, Kelly, Fulda, Lee, Sava, and Debica; the Dunlop brand is offered by Goodyear throug h an alliance with the Japanese firm Sumitomo Rubber Industries, Ltd. Goodyear also manufactures and sells other rubber products, includin g belts and hoses, and synthetic rubber chemicals for the transportat ion industry and various other applications, and these activities acc ount for the remaining revenue. The company is also one of the world' s largest operators of commercial truck service and tire retreading c enters, and runs a network of more than 1,700 tire and auto service c enters that sell and install tires and provide automotive repair serv ices. On the manufacturing side, Goodyear operates more than 90 plant s, of which 30 are in the United States, the balance being in 27 othe r countries. The company's marketing reach extends to 185 countries, with about 54 percent of revenues generated outside the United States .

After Founding in Late 19th Century, Goodyear Quickly Became House hold Name

Without the discovery by U.S. inventor Charles Goodyear of vulcanizat ion (the process by which extreme heat renders rubber flexible and st rong) the modern rubber industry would not exist. Goodyear had nothin g to do with the company that bears his name. He died insolvent in 18 60, 38 years before Frank A. Seiberling founded Goodyear in Akron, Oh io, destined to be the world's first rubber concern to post $1 bi llion in sales. It reigned as the world's largest tire maker for seve n decades.

Bicycle and carriage tires were the company's major products until th e start of automobile tire production in 1901. Seiberling's 1899 appl ication to make carriage tires under Consolidated Tire Company's pate nt was refused, so he started manufacturing a similar tire without a license, claiming it was monopolistic for Consolidated to grant paten t licenses selectively. The ensuing legal battle meant that Goodyear' s first- and second-year profits from the sale of carriage tires were held in escrow until the court decided, in Goodyear's favor, in 1902 .

Goodyear introduced its straight-side tire under the Wingfoot tradema rk adopted in 1900, with a full-scale national magazine advertising c ampaign in 1905. The tire was quickly detachable from its rim, and th is popular tire made Goodyear a household name.

Seiberling followed David Hill to the presidency in 1906, with Paul W . Litchfield, George M. Stadelman, and Frank Seiberling's brother Cha rles Seiberling composing the formative management team. In 1907 Good year opened its Detroit shop, providing 1,200 tires to equip Henry Fo rd's new Model T. By 1909 auto tire production jumped to 36,000, and Goodyear's sales reached $4.25 million, double that of the previo us year. By 1910 Goodyear provided one-third of all original tires on U.S. cars. In 1909 Goodyear started production of airplane tires.

In 1910 Litchfield acquired a method for bonding rubber over fabric f rom North British Rubber Company in Edinburgh, Scotland. Goodyear's r ubberized fabric, soon used for planes, including the Wright brothers ', also formed the shell of early dirigibles, the production of which commenced in 1910.

By 1916 Goodyear had grown to become the world's largest tire company . It adopted a longstanding company slogan that year: "More people ri de on Goodyear tires than on any other kind."

Goodyear's tire production rose from 250 per day in 1916 to nearly 4, 000 per day by the end of World War I. The company made 1,000 balloon s and 60 airships during the war, as well as 715,000 gas masks and so me 4.75 million other military supply parts, such as tire valves. It also provided many of the tires used on aircraft. Wages rose, and bot h the company and its employees ended the war years in prosperity. Sa les had jumped from $110 million in 1916-17 to $172 million i n 1918-19, and to $223 million in 1920.

Nearing Bankruptcy in Early 1920s

Only two days after the November 1918 armistice, the government cance led its contracts and decontrolled prices. The economy swelled as ind ustry rushed to meet postwar demand, but sales fell in late 1920 as u nemployment and bankruptcy soared. Goodyear felt the squeeze as early as 1918, when it made its first attempt to recapitalize by a direct sale of stock to customers and employees.

As the recession deepened, Goodyear was forced to turn to bankers, a position Frank Seiberling in particular was loathe to assume. In 1920 , nonetheless, the company accepted temporary refinancing of $18 million from a banking syndicate headed by Goldman, Sachs & Co. o f New York and A.G. Becker of Chicago. The effort was not sufficient, and bankruptcy loomed imminent as the book value of its common stock , at $75 million in early 1920, was reduced to zero. By 1921 sale s had fallen to $105 million with a $5 million loss.

In early 1921 the New York law firm of Cravath, Henderson, Liffingwel l & De Gersdorff connected Goodyear with an investment bank, Dill on, Read, & Co., that agreed to manage Goodyear's refinancing and reorganization. Of the original officers, only Litchfield and Stadel man remained with the company. Frank Seiberling left and soon thereaf ter incorporated Seiberling Rubber Company, later acquired by Firesto ne. President E.G. Wilmer and a new management team were brought in. Wilmer focused on creating financial vigor at Goodyear, making few ch anges, if any, in the production and sales realms. One month after hi s appointment, in June 1921, he had reduced debt from $66 million to $26.5 million. Of 469 creditor claims in 1921, all but seven were settled. Sales picked up to $123 million in 1923, from $ 103.5 million in 1921. In 1923 Stadelman moved into the presidency, W ilmer assumed the board chairmanship, and Litchfield moved into the f irst vice presidency. Wilmer would resign from Goodyear to head Dodge Brothers, the forerunner of the Dodge Motor Company, in 1926.

The world's largest tire producer since 1916, Goodyear became the wor ld's largest rubber producer by 1926. By 1928 the company operated in 145 countries and sales reached $250 million. Stadelman did not live to see the company reach that point, as he died in January 1926. Litchfield assumed the presidency, commencing a 30-year tenure as ch ief executive officer. He spent his first year resolving litigation b egun in 1922 by Goodyear common stockholders to increase their power and improve the position of common and preferred stock. The battle wa s concluded in 1927, on terms satisfactory to the stockholders.

Goodyear had produced all of the significant U.S. dirigibles since 19 11, and it was commissioned in 1928 to build two huge dirigibles for the U.S. Navy. The enormous Goodyear airdock, then the world's larges t building without internal supports, was erected to accommodate the project. Despite Litchfield's personal interest in the field of light er-than-air craft, the industry came to an end in 1937 with the crash of the Hindenburg. Goodyear's famous fleet of smaller, nonrig id blimps continued to enjoy recognition at outdoor events since they were first floated as a friendly company trademark in the 1930s.

Goodyear was the defendant in one of the most famous antitrust cases of all time beginning in 1933 when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charged that its cost-plus-6-percent purchasing contract with Sears, Roebuck and Co. discriminated against independent dealers in violati on of the Clayton Act, a U.S. antitrust law. The FTC issued a cease-a nd-desist order in March 1936, and Goodyear appealed to the courts. L ater that year, however, the Clayton Act was stringently amended, in large part because of the Goodyear case. In light of the stricter law , Goodyear voluntarily terminated its Sears contract. The federal Cir cuit Court of Appeals planned to drop the case, but Goodyear wanted i ts name cleared and the commission wanted a precedent set for other c ases, so the court was pushed to make a firm decision. In 1939 it cam e out for Goodyear, relieving any threat of future damage claims by d ealers. Goodyear's one-time loyal buyer, Sears, became a serious comp etitor as it took its business to manufacturers selling only to mass distributors.

Prior to the 1930s Goodyear's labor conflicts had been limited. In 19 13 some Goodyear workers joined 15,000 other rubber workers in a stri ke against Akron's other rubber companies organized by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). The strike was terminated after 48 days by worker vote, but it did mark the beginning of employee-initiated g ains in Akron. The following year Goodyear instituted the eight-hour work day and a paid vacation plan for workers of five to nine years' tenure. A number of employee benefit programs were established, inclu ding an in-factory hospital, a worker-oriented company newspaper call ed Wingfoot Clan, and athletic leagues that attracted many a s ports-minded employee. In 1915 Litchfield donated an amount equal to his first 15 years' salary, about $100,000, to the factory worker s to be used at their discretion. In later decades this fund provided scholarships to children of Goodyear employees or retirees.

Labor Strife Marking 1930s

In 1919 under Litchfield's direction, Goodyear formed the industrial assembly, a representative body of 60 employees that voiced worker in terests to management. The assembly existed for 16 years, until its p lace was challenged by newly organized chapters of the American Feder ation of Labor (AFL). Coleman Claherty, a major force in the AFL, beg an organizing in Akron in 1933 and, within the year, won 20,000 membe rs throughout the city, 1,000 of whom formed Goodyear's Local 2. The first international convention of the United Rubber Workers (URW) was held in September 1935.

In 1935 the local union chapters demanded that the companies recogniz e them as bargaining representatives for all employees. The companies refused, and the unions threatened to strike. At Goodyear a companyw ide vote carried out by the industrial assembly voted down a strike 1 1,516 to 891. The unions threatened to strike based solely on member vote, and the federal government resolved tensions by establishing th e Perkins agreement, which essentially required management to consult the unions on all wage and scheduling issues.

Goodyear had established a six-hour work day in 1932 to lessen the ef fects of the Great Depression among workers, by reducing layoffs and distributing work as evenly as possible among remaining employees. Wh en national price controls were removed in 1935, however, Goodyear re established the eight-hour work day to increase productivity, decreas e its prices, and make its products more competitive. The industrial assembly requested a return to the six-hour shift, and when this was denied it appealed to the board of directors. Local 2, encouraged by the industrial assembly's tenacity, appealed to the secretary of labo r, who ruled in January 1936 that Goodyear was unjustified in its rev ersion to the eight-hour shift because it had voluntarily established a shorter day. The government also charged Goodyear with discriminat ing between industrial assembly and union workers. At the time, union membership was at 10 percent.

Goodyear returned to the six-hour day as suggested, but layoffs becam e necessary as tire sales decreased, and the union struck in February 1936. Goodyear's strikers were supported by union sympathizers from other rubber companies and by Ohio and West Virginia coal miners from John L. Lewis's Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO). Within two days, thousands were picketing Goodyear's three major Akron plant s. More than 1,000 employees, including Litchfield, moved into the fa ctories to maintain as much production as possible. The union strateg y was to break Goodyear, the largest rubber factory, so that the othe r companies would be more compliant. After 34 days the strike was set tled by direct negotiations.

With a three-month stock of goods, Goodyear did not suffer financiall y from the strike, but the show of union muscle upped URW membership throughout Akron and increased Goodyear union members to 5,000. The W agner Act, or National Labor Relations Act, was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in April 1937. The industrial assembly was categorized as a company union and had to be disbanded. Workers supported the mov e to URW representation by a ratio of more than two to one.

Sitdowns and interworker violence frequently disrupted production aft er the 1935 strike, culminating in a May 1938 sitdown that attracted picketers even though none were formally requested. Police were summo ned to disperse the demonstrators, and in an ensuing riot 100 people were injured. The company and union negotiated three days later and s itdowns decreased. Goodyear had decreased employees in Akron from 58, 316 in 1929 to 33,285 in 1939. In 1941, after three years of cooperat ion, Goodyear signed its first formal contract with Local 2.

Despite labor and litigation difficulties during the 1930s, Goodyear continued its expansion. An Alabama plant and two textile mills were built in 1929, followed by another textile mill in 1933. In 1935 the company acquired a bankrupted company, Kelly-Springfield Tire Company . Another plant was acquired in Akron in 1936, and a Vermont factory was purchased to centralize shoe sole-and-heel production.

Goodyear's foreign expansion, begun in 1910 with its first of two Can adian plants, continued during the 1930s. In addition to its London a nd Australian plants, operative since 1912, Goodyear had distributors located throughout northern Europe, Russia, Central and South Americ a, and the Caribbean. In 1931 a tire plant was opened just outside Bu enos Aires, Argentina. The sixth foreign factory went up in Bogor, on Java in Indonesia in 1935, and the seventh was built in 1938 in Sao Paolo, Brazil. A Swedish plant was opened in 1939. Rubber plantations were established during the 1930s in Indonesia, Costa Rica, and the Philippines. Goodyear Foreign Operations was created to manage the co mpany's 18 foreign subsidiaries, seven factories, seven plantations, 37 branches, 28 depots, and hundreds of distributors located outside of the United States.

Goodyear patented its first synthetic rubber, Chemigum, in 1927. It w as first mass produced in 1935, and tires were made of it in 1937. In 1934 the company introduced Pliolite, a compound that cemented rubbe r to metal, and Pliofilm, a packaging material. Other popular Goodyea r products were rubber floor tiles; many new models of tires; Airfoam , a cushioning material for seats and mattresses; and Neolite, a synt hetic heel-and-sole material.

Return to Military Contracting During World War II

Goodyear began producing 200,000 gas masks a month for the U.S. Army after Adolf Hitler's April 1939 invasion of Poland. The same year, Go odyear Aircraft Corporation (GAC) was established, and the Goodyear a irdock, unused since the demise of the giant airships, housed wartime airplane and parts production, as well as the construction of 132 bl imps for coastal submarine defense. In 1941 Goodyear joined other man ufacturers to produce parts for 100 B-26 bombers a month. In 1943 som e of GAC's 32,000 employees worked on the plane that dropped A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, a B-29 Superfortress. GAC also pro duced 4,008 Vought Corsair FG1 fighter planes, beginning in 1943.

In 1940 Edwin J. Thomas, who began as Litchfield's secretary and assi stant in the 1920s, ascended to the presidency as Litchfield continue d as chairman of the board. The company took on management of a gover nment-owned factory producing propellant charges for 600 types of art illery shells in 1940. In 1941 the U.S. government required each of t he "big four" rubber producers--Goodyear, General Tire, Firestone, an d Goodrich--to construct plants that would produce 400,000 tons a yea r of GRS, or government rubber, a synthetic compound including styren e and butadiene. Goodyear supervised the construction of three synthe tic rubber plants for the government. Two of the plants became owned and operated by the company. Goodyear sales increased 52 percent over 1940.

Goodyear also produced the top-secret phantom fleet, used to confuse Nazi reconnaissance before the D-Day invasion of Normandy. The "fleet " was made of rubberized material, from which Goodyear constructed li fe-sized inflatable replicas of amphibious invasion craft, PT boats, tanks, combat vehicles, and heavy artillery. These impostors were inf lated and deployed in one coastal English base, then rapidly deflated and moved by night to another. To Axis surveillance, the apparent se rial establishment and abandonment of fighting bases was inexplicable and may have contributed to their unstable coastal defense.

Extraordinary Growth Following World War II

When the war concluded, the government canceled $432 million in G oodyear contracts. GAC released almost 27,000 employees, reducing its payroll to 2,000 by 1946. Demobilization increased demand for consum er tires, and sales increased to 25 million in 1946-47. Goodyear esta blished factories in Colombia and Venezuela in 1945, in Cuba in 1946, and in South Africa in 1947. A Japanese-occupied factory in Indonesi a was regained in 1945, as well as a rubber plantation in 1949. In it s 50th year, 1948, Goodyear reached a peacetime sales record of $ 705 million. It employed 72,000 workers worldwide and was poised to e xpand its international presence.

In its first 50 years, Goodyear total sales had been $9 billion; in the decade from 1949 to 1958, sales would top $11.5 billion. I n 1951 Goodyear became the first rubber company to exceed $1 bill ion in sales in one year. Goodyear's World War II production record g arnered it several government contracts associated with the Korean Wa r in 1950. A subsidiary, Goodyear Atomic Corp., was founded in 1952 w hen the government selected the company to operate a $1.2 billion atomic plant under construction in Pike County, Ohio. The facility o pened in 1954.

In 1954 Goodyear acquired its first new plantation in 20 years in Bel em, Brazil. The following year it acquired two government-owned rubbe r factories it had operated during the war. That same year, at Goodye ar's Gadsden, Alabama, plant, an $11.5 million investment elevate d it to the largest tire-making facility in the United States. In 195 7 it also built a 7,200-acre tire testing site with 18.5 miles of mul tisurface roads.

Rubber consumption after World War II was double that of prewar produ ction. Much of the increase was due to new rubber products such as fo am rubber, film, and plastics, and growth was fueled by newly develop ing synthetic rubbers such as polyisoprene, introduced by Goodyear in 1955 and called Natsyn, for commercial purposes. In 1960 Goodyear bu ilt a $20 million synthetic rubber plant in Beaumont, Texas; its annual production of 40,000 tons of Natsyn equaled the annual generat ion of 15,000 acres of rubber trees.

In 1958 Thomas became chairman of the board, and Litchfield moved to honorary chairman. Russell DeYoung became Goodyear's ninth president; his first full-time Goodyear position had been that of a tire inspec tor. DeYoung appointed Robert H. Lane as public relations director in 1958. Lane was largely responsible for the makeover of Goodyear's pu blic profile from a somewhat stodgy, though quality, tire maker, to a contemporary innovator. The key to this image update was Goodyear's reentry into racing. Once it overcame Firestone's domination of the f ield, Goodyear was able to equip winning cars in the Daytona 500 and other popular U.S. and European races. Lane also clearly defined the role of the Goodyear blimp as a corporate goodwill ambassador, capita lizing on the company's historic association with airships.

Foreign operations were consolidated in February 1957 under Goodyear International Corporation (GIC). In 1959 GIC initiated its European e xpansion program with construction of a plant in Amiens, France. Tire plants were built in 1965 at Cisterna di Latina, Italy, and in 1967 in Phillipsburg, Germany, giving Goodyear production sites in Europe' s three major markets within ten years.

In the United States, Goodyear's expansion was partly by acquisition. In 1959 the company added a $3 million aeronautics research and development laboratory in Litchfield Park, Arizona, to supplement GAC 's activities. The subsidiary received a $65 million contract in 1958 to produce Subroc, an antisubmarine missile. Goodyear would cont inue to derive much of its business from U.S. military and space prog ram contracts, including production of equipment for several of the A pollo moon missions. In 1961 the company bought Geneva Metal Wheel Co mpany, a maker of specialty wheels, and in 1964 acquired Motor Wheel Corporation, the world's largest maker of styled auto wheels. That sa me year, it was the first rubber corporation to exceed $2 billion in annual sales. Its profits were in excess of $100 million, wit h foreign subsidiaries contributing more than one-third.

In 1966, two years after Victor Holt assumed the presidency, Goodyear opened its tenth U.S. tire plant, in Danville, Virginia. This was fo llowed in 1967 by a $73 million facility at its 593-acre site in Union City, Tennessee. Goodyear's sales doubled during the 1960s, top ping $3 billion in 1969--Goodyear was the first rubber company to hit that mark. Net income rose from $71 million to $155 mill ion.

1970s: Achieving Position As the World's Leading Radial Tire Produ cer

Goodyear's biggest challenge in the 1970s was overhauling its factori es to produce radial tires. The radial, with its excellent reinforcem ent system and extra belt of steel, was introduced by France's Michel in in 1948, and by 1972 it equipped 8 percent of U.S. cars. Recognizi ng the superiority of the radial, Goodyear introduced a transitional fiberglass reinforced tire in 1967, and by 1972, 50 percent of U.S. c ars rode on them. When Charles J. Pilliod assumed the presidency in 1 972, he insisted that Goodyear bear the expense of adapting to full r adial technology. The radial tire equipped 45 percent of U.S. cars by 1976, and Goodyear was the world's largest radial producer. In 1977, with a media blitz extolling its all-season tread, Goodyear introduc ed its Tiempo radial, the company's most successful tire to that time .

Goodyear's 75th anniversary year, 1973, was marred by the debilitatin g Middle East oil crisis. In 1974, Pilliod became chairman and chief executive officer, John H. Gerstenmaier assumed the presidency, and G oodyear, prompted by the government, formed a joint project to stimul ate domestic propagation of guayale, a native North American bush tha t provided 50 percent of U.S. rubber until 1910. As oil prices declin ed, however, the project slowed. In 1975 Mark Donohue, a well-known c ar racer, was killed when a tire blew out during prerace preparations . In 1984 his estate was awarded a $9.6 million settlement from G oodyear, one of the largest wrongful death payments in history.

In 1976 Goodyear suffered its longest strike ever when URW workers wa lked out on Goodyear, Goodrich, Uniroyal, and Firestone after talks a t Firestone, the target company, failed. Goodyear's 22,000 strikers a nd their cohorts at the other companies returned to work some 130 day s later, having obtained an agreement that wages and benefits would b e increased 36 percent over the following three years.

In 1979 Goodyear fought hard and succeeded in avoiding the "neutralit y" clause accepted by the other three rubber companies, which guarant eed that companies would not interfere with URW organizing. This was motivated by its desire to create a nonunion shop at its newly built Lawton, Oklahoma, facility. Pilliod's new labor relations policies re quired individual workers, rather than supervisors, to be responsible for quality control. The new policies also provided regular and ongo ing communications between management and laborers as well as worker involvement in problem solving. The factory was considered 50 percent more efficient than older facilities, and, by 1983, factory worker t urnover was down to less than one-third of 1 percent.

In 1977 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accused Goodyear of maintaining a clandestine fund of $1.5 million to make foreig n and domestic political contributions and government and labor bribe s. The SEC charged that the company had made $500,000 in dubious payments since 1970 in 20 foreign countries. Goodyear agreed, without admitting guilt, to a permanent court injunction against violations of federal securities laws, providing a report of its activities in t he countries in question. Two years prior, in 1975, Goodyear said it made political contributions of at least $242,000 between 1964 an d 1972.

Robert E. Mercer assumed the presidency in 1978, when Gerstenmaier re tired. That year Goodyear tire production was terminated in Akron, bu t the company began building Goodyear Technical Center, a $750 mi llion research and design complex located on 3,000 acres in Akron. By 1980 despite national and global recession, Goodyear had record earn ings of $264.8 million and had reduced debt to its lowest level i n 17 years. By 1984 it supplied one-third of the U.S. tire market and one-fifth of the world tire market. In 1983 Pilliod retired, Mercer became chief executive officer, and Tom H. Barrett was voted presiden t.

Briefly Focusing on Diversification in the 1980s

Having won the ten-year battle to remain leader of the tire market, G oodyear entered the 1980s planning to scale some other peaks. Its div ersification goal was to reduce tire revenues to one-half of corporat e earnings and generate the other half through its GAC subsidiary and Celeron Corp., a Louisiana oil and gas concern purchased in 1983. GA C had expanded at a compound annual rate of 17 percent from 1973 to 1 983, providing a 20 percent return on investment. In 1983 its annual sales were $617 million, despite a questionable $50 million i nvestment in the production of centrifuges to enrich uranium for nucl ear power plants. Celeron, although its sales slipped the year after it was purchased, began construction of the then promising $750 m illion All American Pipeline, a 1,200-mile tube used to transport 300 ,000 barrels per day of offshore California crude oil to Texas refine ries.

The diversification came to an abrupt end in 1986, when takeover spec ialist Sir James Goldsmith made a bid for Goodyear. The company was a ble to beat off this takeover, but only by selling most of its nontir e concerns, including GAC, which went to Loral Company for $588 m illion, and parts of Celeron, which went to Exxon Corporation for  6;650 million. Barrett became chief executive officer in 1988 and rem ained president. In 1989 the company divested its South African opera tions, which it had maintained despite the social protest against apa rtheid during the 1980s.

1990s Rebound, Backed by Aquatread and Global Expansion

In 1990 Goodyear took its first loss since 1932 and surrendered its p osition as the world's largest tire maker to Michelin, when the Frenc h company bought out Goodrich's tire business, which had been merged with Uniroyal's. Firestone and General, weakened by Goodyear's domina nce in the radial market, were absorbed, respectively, by Japan's Bri dgestone and Germany's Continental AG, forcing upon Goodyear competit ion of its own size. Its All American Pipeline, prevented from operat ing at full capacity by environmental restrictions, continued to prod uce losses; the company's $3.3 billion long-term debt, largely in curred by the Goldsmith battle, was also a weakness. Analysts pointed to Goodyear's sluggish internal efficiency as a major problem. For t he first time since 1921, Goodyear went outside company ranks to choo se a chairman and chief executive officer, as Stanley C. Gault succee ded Barrett in June 1991. Gault had been chairman and chief executive of Rubbermaid, Incorporated, while serving on Goodyear's board.

Between 1989 and 1991, Goodyear eliminated 12,000 jobs, or 10 percent of its workforce, with more than one-half of that coming from the sa laried sector. In combination with the $1.4 billion investment in modernization and consolidation of factories, these cuts added up to an estimated savings of $250 million annually. Yet Goodyear rema ined committed to its annual research and development budget of more than $300 million a year, confident in this as a source of qualit y tires, such as 1990's Eagle GA and Eagle GT+4, successful luxury ca r models. By restructuring its U.S. marketing tactics, the company re gained its lost market share and was holding its own in the tougher i nternational market. Goodyear was also able by 1992 to reduce its lon g-term debt to a much healthier $1.47 billion.

More important, however, were the new tires rolling out of the compan y's research and development department. In 1991 alone four new Goody ear tires for the replacement market were introduced, the flagship of which was the Aquatread, an all-season passenger tire specially desi gned to provide better traction on rain-slickened roads. The tire pro ved to be a huge and immediate success. More troubling was Gault's 19 92 decision to sell, once again, Goodyear-brand tires at Sears, more than half a century after it had stopped doing so. The following year the company began to sell its name-brand tires through Wal-Mart Stor es and the Discount Tire chain. These moves angered Goodyear dealers, especially because some of their new competitors undercut their pric es on Goodyear tires.

From 1993 to 1995, Goodyear enjoyed healthy profits, which increased from $387.8 million in 1993 to $567 million in 1994 to $6 11 million in 1995, and sales that increased from $11.64 billion in 1993 to $12.29 billion in 1994 to $13.17 billion in 1995. Some of this growth was fueled by global expansion through acquisitio ns and joint ventures. In 1993 the company entered into a joint ventu re in India with Ceat Ltd. to form South Asia Tyres Private Limited a nd build a $150 million tire plant in India. The following year G oodyear purchased a 60 percent stake in Gold Lion (subsequently renam ed Goodyear Qingdao Engineered Elastomers Company Ltd.), an automotiv e hose factory based in Qingdao, China, as well as a 75 percent stake in Dalian International Nordic Tire Co. (later known as Goodyear Dal ian Tire Company Ltd.) based in Dalian, China.

In 1996 the Egyptian-born Samir F. Gibara, who had been president and chief operating officer, replaced Gault as chairman and CEO. That ye ar, Goodyear acquired majority control of TC Debica, the leading pass enger tire maker in Poland; the company planned to take advantage of Debica's central location and lower-wage environment as it expanded i n Europe. This acquisition also meant that Goodyear now had manufactu ring facilities in four of the world's most important developing area s: Eastern Europe, India, China, and Latin America. Late in 1996, Goo dyear reentered South Africa with the $121 million purchase of 60 percent of Contred Ltd., a unit of Anglovaal Industries Ltd. and a m aker of tires, power transmissions, and conveyor belts.

The company's global spending spree continued in 1997. Early that yea r Goodyear entered into a manufacturing agreement with Sumitomo Rubbe r Industries Ltd. of Japan, through which the companies would manufac ture tires for each other in Asia and North America. Goodyear's prese nce in eastern Europe was bolstered in May 1997 when Goodyear signed agreements with the Sava Group, based in Kranj, Slovenia, to form two joint ventures through which Goodyear would acquire a 60 percent int erest in Sava's tire business and a 75 percent interest in its engine ered products business.

Goodyear was not idle at home either. In 1995 the company's retail ti re presence was beefed up through the purchase of 860 Penske Auto Cen ters and more than 300 Montgomery Ward-operated auto centers. The fol lowing year Goodyear unveiled the Infinitred, the first passenger tir e with a manufacturer's lifetime treadwear limited warranty. In the s pring of 1997 Goodyear had to endure its first strike in more than 20 years, when 12,500 United Steelworkers of America members went out o n strike. This proved to be a brief setback as a contract agreement ( an unusually long six-year pact) was reached after only 18 days of pi cketing. In June of that year Goodyear's Kelly-Springfield Tire unit entered into a long-term supply agreement with Lincolnton, North Caro lina-based J.H. Heafner Co., whereby Kelly-Springfield would make at least one million Winston tires annually to be sold through Heafner's network of tire distributors, one of the country's largest. Goodyear in July 1997 unveiled a line of "run-flat" tires called EMT ("extend ed mobility tire" or "empty"), which enabled a car to be driven betwe en 50 and 200 miles at speeds up to 55 miles per hour on a deflated, even punctured, tire. Such tires also eliminated the need for a spare tire.

In early 1998 Goodyear finally offloaded its troubled and noncore Cel eron unit and its All American Pipeline, selling the operations to Pl ains Resources for $420 million. In anticipation of this divestit ure, Goodyear in the fourth quarter of 1996 had taken a $572.2 mi llion charge, most of which was a write-down of Celeron assets. Conti nuing to invest overseas, Goodyear acquired full control of both Cont red in South Africa and India's South Asia Tyres in 1998. The company that year also launched a new manufacturing system called Impact tha t by making greater use of automation was expected to improve uniform ity, cut production times by 70 percent, use 15 percent less material , and slash labor costs by 35 percent. In another efficiency initiati ve, Goodyear was working to integrate its Kelly-Springfield operation s, which had been run as an independent company based in Cumberland, Maryland, into the parent company's North American operations based i n Akron. By mid-1999 this process was complete, and the Kelly-Springf ield offices were shut down.

The key development of the late 1990s, however, was the broad allianc e cemented in 1999 between Goodyear and Sumitomo Rubber. The complex deal centered around six joint ventures, the largest one consisting o f 14 Goodyear and Sumitomo factories in Western Europe and selling Go odyear brand tires and tires under Sumitomo's Dunlop and Sumitomo bra nds. Initial revenues for this venture were $4 billion. Goodyear controlled 75 percent of this venture, which had initial revenues of $4 billion, and the company assumed the same percentage stake in a U.S. venture that took control of Sumitomo's two U.S. factories, in Huntsville, Alabama, and Buffalo, New York, and that had $800 mi llion in sales. The two partners also combined their global purchasin g and research and development operations into two joint ventures maj ority owned by Goodyear, and Sumitomo took majority ownership of two joint ventures in Japan. The deal also involved the two firms taking small stakes in each other and Goodyear paying Sumitomo nearly $1 billion for the latter's contributions to the ventures. The alliance was projected to yield annual cost savings of more than $300 mil lion after three years. Simultaneous with the announcement of the Sum itomo deal, Goodyear revealed plans to cut more than 2,500 jobs world wide and shut down its 70-year-old tire plant in Gadsden, Alabama, an d a Kelly-Springfield plant in Freeport, Illinois, yielding another & #36;100 million to $150 million in savings annually. Manufacturin g was also to be consolidated at several plants in Asia and Latin Ame rica, where demand had fallen off in tandem with regional economic tr avails.

For Goodyear, the key to the Sumitomo deal was gaining much broader r ights to market Dunlop brand tires, which Goodyear positioned as its midprice brand, between the premium Goodyear brand and the inexpensiv e Kelly. The deal also temporarily vaulted the company back into firs t place among global tire makers, surpassing Bridgestone and Michelin . In a clear blow, however, Goodyear suffered the ignominy of being b ooted out of the prestigious Dow Jones Industrial Average late in 199 9 after 59 years on the index, as part of a periodic rejiggering of t he Dow to better reflect the overall U.S. economy.

Early 2000s: Bouncing Back from Near Bankruptcy

The first years of the 21st century were dire ones at Goodyear. The c ompany barely eked out a profit in 2000 as it struggled under the wei ght of high raw materials costs, a strong dollar, a heavy debt load ( largely attributable to the Sumitomo deal), and slowing orders from a utomakers. These negatives more than offset the additional business t hat Goodyear had garnered in the wake of a huge tire recall Bridgesto ne/Firestone had been forced to initiate in August 2000. Goodyear res ponded in early 2001 with another restructuring plan, this one involv ing 7,200 job cuts and additional plant closings.

Further job cuts followed later in 2001 as Goodyear moved somewhat be latedly to restructure its enlarged overseas operations. In North Ame rica, the company sharply increased its prices to its large distribut ors, but this sparked a backlash as disgruntled distributors cut back on their tire orders. Business in the U.S. market was hurt further b y the economic recession, and in this down climate American consumers increasingly elected to purchase cheaper tires made by companies usi ng low-wage overseas labor. Continuing its program to exit from nonco re businesses, the company sold its France-based specialty chemical b usiness late in the year. Early in 2002 Goodyear reported a net loss of $203.6 million (later restated to $254.7 million) for 2001 , its first red ink since 1992. Investors abandoned the company's sto ck: shares ended the year at $23.81, down from the high of $7 6.75 recorded in 1998. A further blow came in January when the compan y's credit rating was downgraded to "junk" status, reflecting the hea vy debt load and the lack of earnings.

The crisis at Goodyear accelerated in 2002 as the company suffered a net loss of $1.11 billion (later restated to $1.25 billion), its largest annual loss ever. Substantially contributing to the loss was a fourth-quarter charge of $1.08 billion taken to write down deferred tax credits the company could not use while losing money in North America. At the beginning of 2003 Robert J. Keegan took over as president and CEO, succeeding Gibara, who remained chairman. Keegan had joined Goodyear in October 2000 as president and chief operating officer, having previously spent 28 years at Eastman Kodak Company, w here he rose to president of the company's global consumer imaging bu siness. Keegan added the chairmanship as well in July 2003. Early in the year, meanwhile, Goodyear shares fell below $4, the lowest le vel in at least four decades as the company grappled with a liquidity crisis that threatened bankruptcy. In April, however, Keegan succeed ed in restructuring $2.9 billion in bank debt and stretching out the payments. Further breathing room came in September when the Unite d Steelworkers ratified a new contract with Goodyear that entailed th e slashing of labor costs by $1.15 billion over three years and 3 ,000 job cuts. In return, the company promised to keep open and inves t in all but two of its U.S. factories and to limit imports from its factories in Brazil and Asia. Late in 2003 Goodyear closed its Dunlop tire plant in Huntsville, Alabama.

As the company struggled to recover, it suffered the further embarras sment of having to restate its earnings several times because of acco unting irregularities. The restatements, eventually covering the year s from 1997 to 2004, cut reported earnings by more than $280 mill ion. In May 2004 Goodyear belatedly released its results for the prev ious year, and despite record revenues of $15.12 billion, the fir m posted its third straight loss, $807.4 million. But by this tim e the company was in the midst of turning its fortunes around. Goodye ar patched relations with its dealers, and in February 2004 introduce d a new line of tires, dubbed Assurance, which proved to be hot selle rs. The company also cut back on the number of tires it sold to autom akers as original equipment and sought better deals from automakers o n what had historically been a low-profitability business for tiremak ers. Goodyear also improved its balance sheet through a further restr ucturing of its debt, substantially increasing cash flow. Through the se and other measures, and with the return of its North American Tire unit to profitability, Goodyear returned to the black in 2004, recor ding net income of $114.8 million on record sales of $18.37 b illion.

As part of its ongoing efforts to divest noncore businesses, Goodyear in July 2004 had announced its intention to sell its chemical produc ts division. The company later changed course, concluding it made mor e sense to keep the business, and at the beginning of 2005 the divisi on was integrated into the North American Tire unit. During 2005 Good year sold its Indonesia rubber plantations and its Wingtack adhesives resin business and reached an agreement to sell its farm tire operat ions to Titan International, Inc. for about $100 million. In Sept ember 2005 the company put its engineered products business up for sa le. The unit, producer of rubber hoses, conveyor belts, air springs, and tracks for military vehicles, generated $1.47 billion in reve nue in 2004.

In a hangover from its dark days of the near past, Goodyear in August 2005 received a so-called Wells Notice from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission indicating that the commission was ready to take either civil or administrative action against the firm because of the various accounting problems that had led to the restatements. In Sep tember the company announced that it was seeking to reduce expenses b y up to $1 billion and planned to close additional plants and inc rease sourcing from low-wage Asian markets. In what was becoming a fa miliar lament at U.S. industrial concerns, Goodyear was grappling wit h paying the mounting pension and healthcare costs of current and for mer employees in the United States. It thus appeared that negotiation s for a new labor agreement with the United Steelworkers were likely to center around plant closures, jobs cuts, and cuts to worker benefi ts. The union's contract was slated to expire in July 2006. In the me antime, Goodyear's turnaround continued apace as the firm reported ne t income of $142 million for the third quarter of 2005, the best quarterly result since 1998, and sales of $5.03 billion, the firm 's highest quarterly sales ever.

Principal Subsidiaries: Allied Tire Sales, Inc.; Belt Concepts of America, Inc.; Celeron Corporation; Cosmoflex, Inc.; Dapper Tire Co., Inc.; Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, Ltd. (75%); Goody ear Farms, Inc.; Goodyear International Corporation; The Goodyear Rub ber Plantations Company; Goodyear-SRI Global Purchasing Company (80&# 37;); Goodyear-SRI Global Technology LLC (51%); Goodyear Western Hemisphere Corporation; The Kelly-Springfield Tire Corporation; Laure lwood Properties Inc.; Retreading L Inc.; Retreading L, Inc. of Orego n; Utica Converters Inc. (75%); Wheel Assemblies Inc.; Wingfoot C ommercial Tire Systems LLC; Wingfoot Corporation; Abacom (Pty.) Ltd. (Botswana); Compania Anonima Goodyear de Venezuela; Compania Goodyear del Peru, S.A. (78%); Compania Goodyear, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico); Corporacion Industrial Mercurio S.A. de C.V. (Mexico); Dackia Partner s AB (Sweden; 75%); Dunlop Airsprings (France; 75%); Dunlop G mbH & Co. KG (Germany; 75%); Dunlop Grund und Service Verwalt ungs GmbH (Germany; 75%); Dunlop Tyres Limited (U.K.; 75%); D unlop Versicherungsservice GmbH (Germany; 75%); Fit Remoulds (Ire land) Limited (75%); Fulda Reifen GmbH & Co. KG (Germany; 75& #37;); GD Furstenwalde Vermogensverwaltungs GmbH (Germany; 75%); GHS Goodyear Handelssysteme GmbH (Germany; 75%); Goodyear Austral ia Pty Limited; Goodyear Aviation Japan, Ltd. (85%); Goodyear Bel ting Pty Limited (Australia); Goodyear Brokers Limited (Bermuda); Goo dyear Canada Inc.; Goodyear Chemical Products SAS (France); Goodyear Dalian Tire Company Ltd. (China; 75%); Goodyear de Chile S.A.I.C. ; Goodyear de Colombia S.A.; Goodyear do Brasil Productos de Borracha Ltda (Brazil); Goodyear Dunlop Financial Service GmbH (Germany; 75&# 37;); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Austria GmbH (75%); Goodyear Dunlop T ires Baltic A.S. (Estonia; 75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Belgium N. V. (75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Czech s.r.o. (Czech Republic; 75& #37;); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Danmark A/S (Denmark; 75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Espana S.A. (Spain; 75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Eur ope B.V. (Netherlands; 75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Finance Europe B.V. (Netherlands; 75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Finland OY (75 7;); Goodyear Dunlop Tires France (75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ge rmany GmbH (75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Hellas S.A.I.C. (Greece; 75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ireland Limited (75%); Goodyear D unlop Tires Italia SRL (Italy; 75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Hungar y Trading Ltd. (75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Nederland B.V. (Nethe rlands; 75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Norge A/S (Norway; 75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Polska Sp z.o.o. (Poland; 75%); Goodyear Du nlop Tires Portugal, Unipessoal, Lda. (75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tire s Romania Srl (75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Slovakia s.r.o. (75 7;); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Slovenia d.o.o. (75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Suisse S.A. (Switzerland; 75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Sver ige A.B. (Sweden; 75%); Goodyear Dunlop Tyres UK Ltd. (75%); Goodyear Earthmover Pty Ltd (Australia); Goodyear Engineered Products Europe d.o.o. (Slovenia); Goodyear Finance Holding S.A. (Luxembourg) ; Goodyear France Aviation Products S.A.; Goodyear GmbH & Co. KG (Germany; 75%); Goodyear India Limited (74%); Goodyear Indust rial Rubber Products Ltd. (U.K.); Goodyear Italiana S.p.A. (Italy; 75 %); Goodyear Jamaica Limited (60%); Goodyear Korea Company; G oodyear Lastikleri Turk Anonim Sirketi (Turkey; 74.61%); Goodyear Luxembourg Tires S.A. (75%); Goodyear Malaysia Berhad (51%); Goodyear Marketing & Sales Snd. Bhd. (Malaysia; 51%); Goodye ar Maroc S.A. (Morocco; 55%); Goodyear Middle East FZE (Dubai); G oodyear Nederland B.V. (Netherlands); Goodyear New Zealand, Ltd.; Goo dyear Orient Company (Private) Limited (Singapore); Goodyear Philippi nes, Inc. (88.54%); Goodyear Productos Industriales S. De R.L. De C.V. (Mexico); Goodyear Productos Industriales, C.A. (Venezuela); Go odyear Qingdao Engineered Elastomers Company Ltd. (China; 60%); G oodyear Russia LLC; Goodyear Sales Company Limited (Taiwan; 75.5% ); Goodyear S.A. (France); Goodyear S.A. (Luxembourg); Goodyear Servi cios Comerciales S. De R.L. De C.V. (Mexico); Goodyear Servicios Y As istencia Tecnica S. De R.L. De C.V. (Mexico); Goodyear Singapore Pte Limited; Goodyear Solid Woven Belting (Pty) Limited (South Africa); G oodyear South Africa (Proprietary) Limited; Goodyear South Asia Tyres Private Limited (India; 99.4%); Goodyear SRI Global Purchasing Y ugen Kaisha & Co. Ltd (Japan; 80%); Goodyear Taiwan Limited ( 75.5%); Goodyear (Thailand) Public Company Limited (66.8%); G oodyear Tyres Pty Ltd (Australia); Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Holdings (Pty.) Ltd (South Africa); Goodyear Wingfoot KK (Japan); Gran Industr ia de Neumaticos Centroamericana, S.A. (Guatemala; 79%); Hi-Q Aut omotive (Pty.) Ltd. (South Africa); KDIS Distribution (France; 75% ;); Kelly-Springfield Puerto Rico, Inc.; Kelly-Springfield Tyre Co. ( Australia) Pty. Ltd.; Magister Limited (Mauritius); Multimarkenmanage ment GmbH & Co KG (Germany; 75%); Neumaticos Goodyear S.R.L. (Argentina); Nippon Giant Tire Co., Ltd. (Japan; 65%); Pneu Holdi ng (France; 75%); Property Leasing S.A. (Luxembourg); P.T. Goodye ar Indonesia Tbk (85%); Rubber & Associated Manufacturing (Pt y) Ltd. (South Africa); RVM Reifen Vertriebsmanagement GmbH (Germany) ; Sava Tires, d.o.o. (Slovenia; 75%); S.A. Vulco Belgium N.V. (75 %); Servicios Y Montjes Eagle, S. de R.L. (Mexico); South Pacific Tyres (Australia; 50.01%); South Pacific Tyres New Zealand Limit ed (50.01%); SP Brand Holding GEIE (Belgium; 75%); Three Way Tyres (Botswana); Tire Company Debica S.A. (Poland; 59.87%); Tred cor Export Services (Pty) Ltd. (South Africa); Tredcor Southern Zimba bwe (Pvt.) Limited (60%); Tredcor (Zambia) Limited; Trentyre Limi ted (Mozambique); Trentyre Holdings (Pty) Ltd (South Africa); Trentyr e (Pty.) Ltd. (South Africa; 92%); Trentyre North Zimbabwe (Pvt.) Limited (51%); Tyre Services (Botswana); Vulco Development (Fran ce; 62.2%); Vulco France; Wingfoot de Chihuahua, S. de R.L. de C. V. (Mexico); 4 Fleet Group GmbH (Germany; 75%).

Principal Operating Units: North American Tire; European Union Tire; Eastern Europe, Middle East & Africa Tire; Latin America T ire; Asia/Pacific Tire; Engineered Products.

Principal Competitors: Bridgestone Corporation; Compagnie Comp agnie Générale des Établissements Michelin; Cont inental AG; Cooper Tire & Rubber Company; Pirelli & C. S.p.A. ; Toyo Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd.; The Yokohama Rubber Company, Limi ted; Kumho Tire Co., Inc.; Hankook Tire Co., Ltd.

Chronology

  • Key Dates:
  • 1898: Frank A. Seiberling founds The Goodyear Tire & Rubbe r Company in Akron, Ohio, naming it after Charles Goodyear, discovere r of the vulcanization process; the firm initially focuses on bicycle and carriage tires.
  • 1901: Production of automobile tires begins.
  • 1910: Company ventures outside United States for the first tim e, establishing a plant in Canada.
  • 1916: Goodyear becomes the largest tire company in the world.
  • 1921: After approaching bankruptcy, Goodyear is refinanced and reorganized.
  • 1926: Goodyear becomes the world's largest rubber company.
  • 1935: Kelly-Springfield Tire Company is acquired.
  • 1951: Revenues exceed the $1 billion mark.
  • 1977: Goodyear introduces its Tiempo radial, its most successf ul tire yet.
  • 1986: Company thwarts a takeover bid by Sir James Goldsmith, t hen restructures by selling off most of its nontire assets.
  • 1990: Goodyear suffers its first net loss since the Great Depr ession.
  • 1991: First outsider is selected to lead Goodyear: Stanley C. Gault; Aquatred radial debuts.
  • 1999: Goodyear cements a broad alliance with Sumitomo Rubber I ndustries, Ltd.
  • 2002: Company reports a record net loss of $1.25 billion, bringing the firm close to bankruptcy.
  • 2004: Assurance tire is introduced; Goodyear returns to profit ability after three straights years in the red.

Additional Details

  • Public Company
  • Incorporated: 1898
  • Employees: 84,786
  • Sales: $18.37 billion (2004)
  • Stock Exchanges: New York Midwest Pacific
  • Ticker Symbol: GT
  • NAIC: 326211 Tire Manufacturing (Except Retreading); 325212 Sy nthetic Rubber Manufacturing; 326212 Tire Retreading; 326220 Rubber a nd Plastics Hoses and Belting Manufacturing; 326299 All Other Rubber Product Manufacturing; 811111General Automotive Repair

Further Reference

  • Aeppel, Timothy, "Deflated: How Goodyear Blew Its Chance to C apitalize on a Rival's Woes," Wall Street Journal, February 19 , 2003, p. A1.
  • ------, "Goodyear, Expecting Loss for Year, May Snub Car Makers," Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2002, p. B2.
  • ------, "Goodyear Is Told It Could Be Hit with SEC Case," Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2005, p. A6.
  • ------, "Goodyear Says Keegan to Succeed Gibara As Chief Executiv e Officer," Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2002, p. A10.
  • ------, "Goodyear Tire to Restate Results for Past Five Years," Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2003, p. A6.
  • ------, "Goodyear to Restate 1997-2003 Profits," Wall Street J ournal, April 13, 2004, p. A3.
  • Allen, Hugh, The House of Goodyear: A Story of Rubber and of M odern Business, Cleveland: Corday & Gross, 1943, reprinted, A rno Press, 1976, 417 p.
  • Byrne, Harlan S., "Gaining Traction," Barron's, June 7, 19 99, pp. 17, 19.
  • Cimperman, Jennifer Scott, "After 59 Years on the Dow, Goodyear G ets Bounced," Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 27, 1999, p. 1A.
  • ------, "Goodyear Plans 7,200 Job Cuts," Cleveland Plain Deale r, February 15, 2001, p. 1C.
  • Donlon, J.P., "A New Spin for Goodyear," Chief Executive, December 1995, pp. 34-35, 38-40.
  • Fahey, Jonathan, "Blowout!," Forbes, March 3, 2003, p. 40.
  • Gerdel, Thomas W., "Goodyear Riding on Assurances: New Line of Ti res Is Fueling Firm's Turnaround Bid," Cleveland Plain Dealer, September 22, 2004, p. C1.
  • ------, "Goodyear's Bumpy Ride: CEO Gibara Deals with Competition , Global Uncertainty," Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 24, 2002, p. G1.
  • Labich, Kenneth, "The King of Tires Is Discontented," Fortune, May 28, 1984.
  • Love, Steve, and David Giffels, Wheels of Fortune: The Story o f Rubber in Akron, edited by Debbie Van Tassel, Akron, Ohio: Univ ersity of Akron Press, 1999, 359 p.
  • Lubove, Seth, "The Last Bastion," Forbes, February 14, 199 4, pp. 56, 58.
  • Magnet, Myron, "The Marvels of High Margins," Fortune, May 2, 1994, pp. 73-74.
  • McNulty, Mike, "Goodyear Plans to Make Major Cost Cuts," Autom otive News, October 17, 2005, p. 8.
  • Narisetti, Raju, "For Two Tire Makers, a Flat-Out Pitch for Safer Wheels," Wall Street Journal, July 3, 1997, p. B4.
  • Neely, William, Tire Wars: Racing with Goodyear, Tucson, A riz.: Aztex Corp., 1993, 192 p.
  • O'Reilly, Maurice, The Goodyear Story, Elmsford, N.Y.: Ben jamin Company, 1983, 223 p.
  • Rodengen, Jeffrey L., The Legend of Goodyear: The First 100 Ye ars, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.: Write Stuff Syndicate, 1997, 251 p.
  • Schiller, Zachary, "After a Year of Spinning Its Wheels, Goodyear Gets a Retread," Business Week, March 26, 1990.
  • ------, "And Fix That Flat Before You Go, Stanley," Business W eek, January 16, 1995, p. 35.
  • ------, "Goodyear May Be Getting Some Traction at Last," Busin ess Week, October 7, 1991, p. 38.
  • ------, "Stan Gault's Designated Driver," Business Week, A pril 8, 1996, pp. 128, 130.
  • Taylor, Alex, III, "Goodyear Wants to Be No. 1 Again," Fortune , April 27, 1998, pp. 130-32, 134.
  • White, Joseph B., "Goodyear Moves to Cut Capacity, Jobs: U.S. Tir e-Making Factory Will Close as Alliance with Sumitomo Is Set," Wal l Street Journal, February 4, 1999, p. A3.

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