Genentech, Inc. - Company Profile, Information, Business Description, History, Background Information on Genentech, Inc.

One DNA Way
South San Francisco, California 94080-4990
U.S.A.

Company Perspectives:

Our mission is to be the leading biotechnology company, using human g enetic information to discover, develop, manufacture and commercializ e biotherapeutics that address significant unmet medical needs. We co mmit ourselves to high standards of integrity in contributing to the best interests of patients, the medical profession, our employees and our communities, and to seeking significant returns to our stockhold ers, based on the continual pursuit of scientific and operational exc ellence.

History of Genentech, Inc.

Genentech, Inc. is the oldest and second largest biotechnology compan y in the world. Genentech discovers, develops, manufactures, and mark ets human pharmaceuticals for significant medical needs. The company fabricates organisms from gene cells, organisms that are not ordinari ly produced by the cells. Conceivably, this process, referred to as g ene splicing or recombinant DNA, may lead to cures for cancer or AIDS . Genentech markets a host of pharmaceuticals, but several of its dru gs stand above the rest, serving as the revenue-generating engines th at propel the company forward. Rituxan, used to treat non-Hodgkin's l ymphoma; Herceptin, designed to treat breast cancer; and Avastin, dev eloped to treat colon cancer, rank as the company's most important pr oducts developed in its oncology franchise.

Early Years

Founded in 1976, Genentech was financed by Kleinman, Perkins, Caufiel d and Byers, a San Francisco high-tech venture capital firm, and by i ts cofounders, Robert Swanson and Herbert Boyer. Swanson, a graduate of the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of T echnology, was employed by Kleinman, Perkins, where he learned of the achievements of Cetus, a biotechnology firm founded in 1971; he deci ded to investigate the prospect of marketing DNA products. Initially, the concept was met with little enthusiasm, but in Herbert Boyer, a distinguished academic scientist, Swanson found someone who enthusias tically supported his plan. One of the first scientists to synthesize life (he had created gene cells with Stanley Cohen), Boyer wanted to take his research further and to create new cells.

Boyer and Swanson decided to leave their respective jobs and to found Genentech (genetic engineering technology). Thomas J. Perkins, a par tner with Kleinman, Perkins, who became Genentech's chairman, suggest ed that the new company subcontract its early research. Swanson follo wed Perkins's advice and contracted the City of Hope National Medical Center to conduct the company's initial research project.

Boyer and Swanson, desiring to achieve credibility for Genentech, wan ted to exhibit their grasp of the relevant technology before they att empted to market products. To accomplish this goal, Boyer intentional ly selected an easily replicated cell with a simple composition, Soma tostatin. The first experiment with Somatostatin required seven month s of research. Scientists on the project placed the hormone inside E. coli bacteria, found in the human intestine. The anticipated result was that the bacteria would produce useful proteins that duplicated S omatostatin, but that did not happen. Then a scientist working on the project hypothesized that proteins in the bacteria were attacking th e hormone. Somatostatin was protected, and the cell was successfully produced. Although it established credibility for the company, the ex periment brought no real financial returns. Boyer and Swanson intende d to produce human insulin as Genentech's first product.

Early in the summer of 1978 Genentech experienced its first breakthro ugh in recreating the insulin gene. This development required an expe nditure of approximately $100 million and 1,000 human years of la bor. By 1982 the company had won approval from the Food and Drug Admi nistration (FDA). Eli Lilly and Company, the world's largest and olde st manufacturer of synthetic insulin, commanded 75 percent of the U.S . insulin market, and Swanson knew that Genentech stood little chance of competing with them. He informed Lilly's directors of Genentech's accomplishments, hoping to attract their attention: he believed that the mere threat of a potentially better product would entice Lilly t o purchase licensing rights to the product, and he was correct. Lilly bought the rights and marketed the product as Humulin. This maneuver provided ample capital for Genentech to continue its work. By 1987 t he company was earning $5 million in licensing fees from Lilly.

Swanson pursued a similar strategy with the company's next product, A lpha Interferon. Hoffmann-La Roche purchased the rights to Interferon --which it marketed as Roferon-A--and paid approximately $5 milli on in royalties to Genentech in 1987. Revenues from these agreements helped to underwrite the costs of new product development, which ran from $25 million to $50 million per product prior to FDA appr oval. Meanwhile, Genentech went public in 1980, raising $35 milli on through an initial public offering.

Entering the Marketing Arena in the Middle to Late 1980s

The first product independently marketed by Genentech, human growth h ormone (HGH) or Protropin, generated $43.6 million in sales in 19 86. Demand for HGH increased as the medical profession learned more a bout the drug's capabilities and diagnosed hormone inadequacy more fr equently. Protropin enjoyed record-setting sales over the next six ye ars, topping $155 million by 1991. Approved by the FDA in 1985, P rotropin helped prevent dwarfism in children. Genentech's entry into the market was facilitated by an FDA decision to ban the drug's prede cessor because it was contaminated with a virus. By the end of the 19 80s a "new and improved" version of HGH patented by Eli Lilly also ha d received approval from the FDA. Lilly's drug, unlike Genentech's ve rsion, actually replicated the growth hormone found in the human body . To counter this potential threat to their market, Genentech sued th e FDA to force the agency to determine which company held exclusive r ights to the product. At the end of 1991, Genentech's Protropin maint ained an impressive 75 percent share of the HGH market.

Such legal disputes were not unusual for biotechnology firms still in their infancy. Because the products of the industry duplicated subst ances found in nature, they challenged long-established patent laws. Traditionally, products and discoveries determined as not evident in nature receive patent awards. Biotechnology firms contested these sta ndards in the courtroom, attempting to force alterations in the law, to make it conform to the needs of the industry. Companies applied fo r broad patents to secure against technological innovations that coul d undermine their niche in the marketplace. For start-up firms such a s Genentech, patent battles consumed large sums of money in both dome stic and foreign disputes.

Genentech introduced tissue plasmogen activator (t-PA) in 1987 as Act ivase, a fast-acting drug that helped to break down fibris, a clottin g agent in the blood. At $2,200 per dose, t-PA was marketed as a revolutionary drug for the prevention and treatment of heart attacks. When Genentech failed to provide the FDA with evidence that Activase prolonged the lives of heart attack victims, the federal agency dela yed approval until 1988. The drug brought in almost half of the compa ny's $400 million in 1989 revenues.

But Activase was soon battered with legal and clinical setbacks. Gene ntech's claim to exclusive ownership of natural t-PA and all syntheti c variations on it was struck down in Britain when the British firm W ellcome Foundation Ltd. challenged Genentech's patent in the British courts, claiming it was overly broad. In 1993, however, Genentech won a court victory against Wellcome, preventing the U.K. firm from mark eting t-PA in the United States until 2005, when Genentech's patent w as due to expire. Clinical data showed that the drug caused serious s ide effects, including severe internal bleeding. A European study ind icated that the drug was faster, but no more effective, than some com petitors costing just $200 per dose. The troubles continued when a controversial study comparing Activase, SmithKline Beecham plc's Em inase, and another firm's streptokinase was released in March 1991. T he International Study of Infarct Survival (ISIS-3) found all three d rugs to be equally effective at keeping people alive, which again ref lected badly on Activase's high cost. Genentech discounted several of the research methods used, then commissioned its own 41,000-patient comparative trial (at a cost of $55 million), which was completed in 1993 and vouched for the superiority of Activase over streptokina se. By the mid-1990s, however, Genentech was selling just $300 mi llion worth of Activase per year, a far cry from the $1 billion a nnual sales it had projected for the product in the late 1980s.

Early to Mid-1990s: From Roche Merger to CEO Controversy

The regulatory, legal, and clinical roadblocks that stymied Genentech 's introduction of Activase, combined with competition from large pha rmaceutical and chemical companies that bought into biotechnology in the late 1980s, culminated in Genentech's 60 percent acquisition by S witzerland's Roche Holding Ltd. The merger was one of many in 1989 an d 1990, which resulted in such pharmaceutical giants as SmithKline Be echam plc and Bristol-Myers Squibb Company. Genentech used the $2 .1 billion influx of capital to fund research, finance patent dispute s, and invest in cooperative ventures to develop synthetic drugs usin g biotechnological discoveries. Also in 1990, G. Kirk Raab, whom the< I> Wall Street Journal described as a "master marketer," was name d CEO of Genentech. That year, the company launched the first commerc ial life sciences experiment in space when it sponsored research aboa rd the space shuttle Discovery, and it received FDA approval t o expand the marketing of Activase to include the treatment of acute massive pulmonary embolism (blood clots in the lungs).

Activase had faced stiff competition when it first entered the market in the late 1980s. Delays in approval gave competitors such as Bioge n and Integrated Genetics the opportunity to catch up with the indust ry leader. A dozen or so companies filed patents for similar drugs. G enentech could not expect to easily secure foreign markets for its ne w drug, either. Competition was stiff; this relatively new industry h ad little time to carve out established markets, and there were impor tant competitors, particularly in Western Europe. In 1991, however, G enentech won an exclusive patent for recombinant t-PA in Japan. Genen tech also had several new products in FDA trials in 1991. An insulin- like growth factor for the treatment of full-blown AIDS patients and relaxin, an obstetric drug, were in development that year. Genentech' s DNase (pronounced dee-en-ayse), for use in the management of cystic fibrosis and chronic bronchitis, entered Phase III FDA trials. The f irm's HER2 antibody entered clinical trials in 1991 as well. This tre atment for breast and ovarian cancer was first developed from mouse c ells. Genentech also was able to begin marketing of interferon gamma, or Actimmune, in 1991. The product's relatively meager sales of $ ;1.7 million were connected to the small number of patients suffering from chronic granulomatous disease, an inherited immunodeficiency.

In 1993 Genentech received regulatory approval to market Pulmozyme, i ts brand name for DNase, in the United States, Canada, Sweden, Austri a, and New Zealand, for the treatment of cystic fibrosis. The company 's relationship with Roche led to the establishment of a European sub sidiary of Genentech to develop, register, and market DNase in 17 pri mary European countries. Genentech also allotted Roche an exclusive l icense to sell DNase anywhere but Europe, the United States, Canada, and Japan. DNase was considered the first major advance in the treatm ent of cystic fibrosis in 30 years. Sales of Pulmozyme--which had gon e from conception to market in just five years, half the industry ave rage--reached $76 million by 1996.

Genentech continued to expand its product line during the 1990s. In M arch 1994 the FDA approved a new Genentech human growth hormone, Nutr opin, for the treatment of growth failure in children. Other uses for Nutropin soon followed, including the treatment of adults suffering from growth hormone deficiency and of short stature associated with T urner syndrome. A third Genentech HGH, Nutropin AQ, the first liquid HGH, received its first FDA approval in 1996. That year the company's line of growth hormone products generated $218.2 million in reve nues.

By mid-1995 Roche's holding in Genentech had increased to about 65 pe rcent. As part of its original stake purchased in 1990, Roche had rec eived the option of purchasing the remainder of the company at $6 0 per share, an option that expired June 30, 1995. In May 1995, howev er, Genentech and Roche reached an agreement whereby the option would be extended to June 30, 1999. The option was set to begin at $61 .25 per share, then increase each quarter by $1.25 until expiring at $82.50. As part of the agreement, Roche took over Genentech's Canadian and European operations, with Genentech agreeing to receive royalties on sales of Pulmozyme in Europe and on sales of all of the company's products in Canada.

In the midst of the negotiations on this deal, Raab approached Roche to seek a $2 million guarantee of a personal loan. When Genentech 's board found out about this improper move, it conducted a broad rev iew of his leadership. Finding other problems, including ongoing fede ral regulatory investigations into charges that Genentech was promoti ng the use of its products in unapproved ways, the board forced Raab to resign in July 1995. Named to replace him as president and CEO was Dr. Arthur Levinson, a molecular biologist who had headed the compan y's research operations. One outcome of the federal probes came in Ap ril 1999, when Genentech finalized an agreement to pay $50 millio n to settle charges that it had illegally marketed Protropin for unap proved uses, such as a kidney disorder and severe burns, from 1985 to 1994. The company also pleaded guilty to a criminal violation, "intr oducing misbranded drugs in interstate commerce."

Revitalizing the Product Pipeline in the Late 1990s

Although many questioned the wisdom of appointing as CEO a scientist who had never before run a company, Levinson helped restore the compa ny's reputation by shifting its focus away from the marketing arena a nd back to the laboratory. Genentech reached new heights in the late 1990s, with revenues surpassing the $1 billion mark for the first time in 1997 before reaching $1.15 billion the year after. The r eemphasis on research revitalized the company's product pipeline, lea ding to a substantial increase in the sales of products Genentech mar keted itself. In 1998 such sales reached $717.8 million, an incre ase of nearly 23 percent from the previous year. The growth was attri butable to the sales of two new products. In November 1997 Genentech began selling a monoclonal antibody called Rituxan, the first such en tity approved to treat a cancer, specifically a form of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (a cancer of the immune system). Sales of Rituxan, which wa s codeveloped with La Jolla, California-based IDEC Pharmaceuticals Co rporation, were $162.6 million in 1998, the first full year of sa les. Monoclonal antibodies are designed to zero in on cancer cells an d kill a tumor without harming healthy tissue. A second Genentech-dev eloped monoclonal antibody, Herceptin, was approved by the FDA in Sep tember 1998 to treat breast cancer. In clinical trials at this time w as a third cancer treatment, called Anti-VEGF, which was being studie d as a treatment for several types of solid-tumor cancers.

In June 1999 Roche exercised its option to acquire the 33 percent of Genentech it did not already own for $82.50 per share, or about & #36;3.7 billion. Just one month later, however, Roche sold about 16 p ercent of Genentech stock back to the public in an initial public off ering (IPO) that raised about $2.13 billion at the offering price of $97 per share. Genentech thereby resumed trading on the New Y ork Stock Exchange but under a new symbol, DNA. In October 1999 Roche made a secondary offering of 20 million Genentech shares at $143 .50, raising $2.87 billion in the largest secondary offering in U .S. history. Following the offerings, Roche held a 66 percent stake i n Genentech, which retained the operational autonomy through which it had thrived.

In November 1999 Genentech agreed to pay $200 million to the Univ ersity of California at San Francisco (UCSF) to settle a nine-year di spute over a patent underlying Protropin. The university had charged that Genentech scientists had stolen a DNA sample from a lab in 1978 and used the specimen to develop Protropin, which by the end of the 1 990s had generated $2 billion in sales over its lifetime. The uni versity had sought $400 million in lost royalties and other damag es.

The UCSF lawsuit was not the only legal blemish on Genentech's record at the turn of the century, but overall the period was more notewort hy because it validated the decision to put Levinson at the helm. In 2002, a Los Angeles County Superior Court jury awarded the Duarte, Ca lifornia-based City of Hope National Medical Center $500 million in royalty payments and punitive damages for Genentech's failure to p ay royalties connected to a licensing agreement in 1976. Specifically , the lawsuit charged that Genentech had hidden licensed sales and no t paid royalties on a process for inserting genes into bacteria and i nducing them to produce proteins, a process developed by two City of Hope scientists. The jury's decision was a blow, to be sure, but with a market capitalization of nearly $30 billion and $2.5 billi on in cash and long-term marketable securities, the company could inc ur the loss without fear of financial collapse. Of a bigger concern w ere the delays in bringing several drugs to market, which cast a pall over Genentech's immediate future at the time the jury's decision wa s announced, at least as indicated by Wall Street's estimation of the company.

A Focus on Cancer for the Future

Levinson's most vital contribution to Genentech was steering the comp any toward oncology, a decision that promised to define his legacy. H e wanted to make Genentech the world's leader in developing drugs to treat cancer, setting 2005 as the target date for the company to achi eve such status. The introduction of Rituxan and Herceptin provided a n intoxicating start to the emphasis on cancer treatments, with each registering stunning success. Herceptin generated $152 million sa les during its first year on the market, making it the most successfu l cancer drug ever, and exhibited fantastic growth with each passing year, building a business volume that grew to $347 million in sal es by 2001. Rituxan demonstrated even greater sales growth, quickly b ecoming a financial boon for Genentech. Between 1999 and 2001, Rituxa n's sales mushroomed from $263 million to $818 million.

Herceptin and Rituxan became the two major sources of growth for Gene ntech during the first years of the decade, replacing the company's t raditional core business of growth hormones and Pulmozyme as the fina ncial foundation of the company. Levinson's decision to focus on onco logy sparked impressive financial growth, but early in the decade the company was beset with delays for its next wave of drugs to enter th e market. Xolair, an asthma drug, was supposed to be released in 2001 , but the FDA demanded more tests midway through the year, which push ed back the release of the drug to the end of 2003. A psoriasis drug, Xanelim, was slated for debut in 2002, but the company did not submi t an application until mid-2002, delaying its introduction. Further, a promising cancer drug known as Tarceva was still years away from be ing released, offering no immediate source of revenue. One drug was p rogressing through the development pipeline faster than expected--Ava stin, scheduled to be released in 2003--but the absence of any new dr ugs entering the market prompted the investment community to voice it s displeasure. Genentech's stock peaked in March 2000 before beginnin g to drop in value substantially. By the end of 2001, the company's s tock had dropped 40 percent. By mid-2002, the stock was trading for 7 5 percent of its value in March 2000. Despite the negative reaction f rom Wall Street, there remained an air of optimism. Genentech, the co mpany that had invented its industry, had legions of admiring fans, i ncluding supporters who worked on Wall Street. "These guys are very, very good," an analyst remarked in a December 18, 2001 interview with Investor's Business Daily. "Wall Street has very high expecta tions for them. So when they miss on expectations, one way or another , the response seems to be magnified."

Levinson and his team fulfilled the expectations of Wall Street by en ding the lull in new drug introductions with a flurry of new pharmace uticals. Xolair, the first humanized therapeutic antibody for the tre atment of asthma, received FDA approval in 2003, the same year the co mpany's psoriasis drug, which was launched as RAPTIVA, received appro val. In 2004, the company's lung cancer drug, Tarceva, which was deve loped with OSI Pharmaceuticals, won approval, but the year's biggest introduction was a drug the company developed on its own. In February 2004, Avastin, which was designed to choke the blood supply that fee ds tumors, was approved for sale by the FDA, the first drug of its ki nd to enter the market. The expectations for Avastin put the drug on the same level of Herceptin and Rituxan, both of which continued to s erve as the lifeblood of the company nearly a decade after their rele ase. Sales of Avastin in the third fiscal quarter of 2005 reached  6;325 million, nearly 80 percent more than the drug had generated dur ing 2004's third quarter. With Avastin's sales expected to surpass &# 36;1 billion within a few years and roughly 30 projects in the compan y's development pipeline, optimism for the future ran high at the com pany's central offices on One DNA Way in South San Francisco. In the years ahead, with an emphasis on oncology delivering enviable results , Genentech promised to remain one of the most successful biotechnolo gy companies in the world.

Principal Subsidiaries: Genentech Espana, S.L. (Spain).

Principal Competitors: Abbott Laboratories; American Home Prod ucts Corporation; Amgen Inc.; Bayer AG; Biogen, Inc.; Bristol-Myers S quibb Company; Chiron Corporation; E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Compan y; Eli Lilly and Company; Genzyme Corporation; Glaxo Wellcome plc; Ho echst AG; Immunex Corporation; Johnson & Johnson; Merck & Co. , Inc.; Novartis AG; Novo Nordisk A/S; Pfizer Inc.; Pharmacia & U pjohn, Inc.; Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.; Schering-Plough Corporation; S mithKline Beecham plc.

Chronology

  • Key Dates:
  • 1976: Robert Swanson and Herbert Boyer found Genentech, Inc.
  • 1978: Company scientists recreate the insulin gene, Genentech' s first marketable product.
  • 1980: Company raises $35 million through an initial public offering (IPO).
  • 1982: Human insulin clone wins FDA approval and is marketed as Humulin under license by Eli Lilly.
  • 1985: Protropin, the first product independently marketed by G enentech, receives FDA approval for the treatment of dwarfism.
  • 1987: Company begins marketing Activase as a way to dissolve b lood clots in heart attack victims.
  • 1990: Switzerland's Roche Holding Ltd. purchases a 60 percent stake in the company for $2.1 billion.
  • 1993: Pulmozyme receives FDA approval for the treatment of cys tic fibrosis.
  • 1994: Company begins marketing a second human growth hormone ( HGH), Nutropin.
  • 1995: Roche agrees to extend its option to buy remainder of Ge nentech for four more years; Genentech board forces CEO G. Kirk Raab to resign after allegations of ethical improprieties arise; Dr. Arthu r Levinson is named as successor.
  • 1996: Nutropin AQ, the first liquid HGH and Genentech's third HGH product, receives FDA approval.
  • 1997: Company begins marketing Rituxan for the treatment of no n-Hodgkin's lymphoma; revenues surpass $1 billion for the first t ime.
  • 1998: FDA approves Herceptin in the treatment of breast cancer .
  • 1999: Company pays $50 million to settle charges that it h ad illegally marketed Protropin for unapproved uses; Roche exercises option to buy remainder of the company, then sells about 34 percent o f its stock back to the public through two public offerings; Genentec h agrees to pay the University of California at San Francisco $20 0 million to settle a patent dispute involving Protropin.
  • 2004: Levinson's emphasis on oncology produces two new drugs, Tarceva and Avastin.

Additional Details

  • Public Subsidiary of Roche Holding Ltd.
  • Incorporated: 1976
  • Employees: 7,646
  • Sales: $3.98 billion (2004)
  • Stock Exchanges: New York
  • Ticker Symbol: DNA
  • NAIC: 325412 Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufactur- ing; 32541 4 Biological Product (Except Diagnostic) Manufacturing; 541710 Resear ch and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences

Further Reference

  • Abrahams, Paul, "Biotech Veteran Seeks a Formula for Growth," Financial Times, July 10, 2002, p. 13.
  • Arancibia, Juan Carlos, "Genentech Keeping Pipeline Full," Inv estor's Business Daily, August 29, 2005, p. B2.
  • Arnst, Catherine, "After 27 Years, a Big Payoff," Business Wee k, June 1, 1998, p. 147.
  • Baum, Rudy, "Knotty Biotech Issues Receive Attention," Chemica l & Engineering News, April 27, 1992, pp. 30-31.
  • Blumenstyk, Goldie, "U. of California Patent Suit Puts Biotech Po werhouse Under Microscope," Chronicle of Higher Education, Aug ust 6, 1999, pp. A45-A46.
  • Bylinsky, Gene, "Got a Winner? Back It Big," Fortune, Marc h 21, 1994, pp. 69-70.
  • Chase, Marilyn, "Hedged Bet: As Genentech Awaits New Test of Old Drug, Its Pipeline Fills Up," Wall Street Journal, April 30, 1 993, p. A1.
  • Crabtree, Penni, "Oceanside Plant Purchase Shows Genentech Is Sai ling," San Diego Union-Tribune, June 19, 2005.
  • Darmiento, Laurence, "Settlement Possible After Huge City of Hope Verdict," Los Angeles Business Journal, June 17, 2002, p. 9.< /LI>
  • Fisher, Lawrence M., "Rehabilitation of a Biotech Pioneer," Ne w York Times, May 8, 1994, Sec. 3, p. 6.
  • "Genentech's Winning Formula," Business Week Online, May 1 7, 2005.
  • Grabarek, Brooke H., "Genentech: Still Nowhere But Up?," Finan cial World, June 21, 1994, pp. 16, 18.
  • Hamilton, Joan, "How Long Can Biotech Stay in the Stratosphere?," Business Week, November 25, 1991, p. 224.
  • ------, "It Ain't Over Till It's Over at Genentech," Business Week, July 24, 1995, p. 41.
  • ------, "A Miracle Drug's Second Coming," Business Week, J une 3, 1996, p. 118.
  • ------, "A Star Drug Is Born," Business Week, August 23, 1 993, p. B6.
  • "Heart Attack Drugs: Trials and Tribulations," Economist, March 19, 1991, pp. 86-87.
  • King, Ralph T., Jr., "'Assembly Line' Revs Up Genentech," Wall Street Journal, March 12, 1998, p. B1.
  • ------, "Genentech Inc. Names Its CEO As Chairman," Wall Stree t Journal, September 23, 1999, p. B18.
  • ------, "Genentech to Pay $200 Million to End Suit Over Paten t," Wall Street Journal, November 17, 1999, p. B7.
  • ------, "Profit Prescription: In Marketing of Drugs, Genentech Te sts Limits of What Is Acceptable," Wall Street Journal, Januar y 10, 1995, p. A1.
  • ------, "Roche to Unload As Much As 17% of Genentech," Wal l Street Journal, October 11, 1999, p. B2.
  • Levine, Daniel S., "Genentech Finds a Swiss Cure for Its Wall Str eet Ills," San Francisco Business Times, June 16, 1995, p. 6.< /LI>
  • McCoy, Charles, "Genentech's New CEO Seeks Clean Slate," Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1995, p. B6.
  • "Mergers and Acquisitions: Strategic Is the Word," Institution al Investor, January 1991, pp. 74-81.
  • Moukheiber, Zina, "The Great White Hunter," Forbes, July 2 6, 1999, pp. 133-36.
  • "A Natural Selection," Chief Executive, May 1992, pp. 34-3 9.
  • Reeves, Amy, "Genentech Inc. South San Francisco, California Hey, Investors: We're Still Turning a Profit," Investor's Business Dai ly, December 18, 2001, p. A12.
  • Rigdon, Joan E., "Fatal Blunder: Genentech CEO, a Man Used to Pus hing Limit, Exceeds It and Is Out," Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1995, p. A1.
  • Shinkle, Kirk, "Genentech Beats Q3 Profit," Investor's Busines s Daily, October 11, 2005, p. A1.
  • Silber, Judy, "Shares of Biotech Company Genentech Fall on Cancer Medication Side-Effect News," Contra Costa Times, August 14, 2004.
  • Slutsker, Gary, "Patenting Mother Nature," Forbes, January 7, 1991, p. 290.
  • Thayer, Ann, "Biotech Firms' Revenues Up But Earnings Win First H alf," Chemical & Engineering News, August 31, 1992, pp. 15 -16.
  • Weintraub, Arlene, "Another Pain for Genentech," Business Week Online, June 17, 2002.
  • ------, "Giving Birth to Biotech," Business Week, October 18, 2004, p. 16.
  • Westphal, Christoph, and Sherry Glied, "AZT and t-PA: The Dispara te Fates of Two Biotechnological Innovations and Their Producers," Columbia Journal of World Business, Spring/Summer 1990, pp. 83-1 00.

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